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 Electronic commerce is important, and perhaps, inevitable. Thus to 
consider the legal implications of the growth and development of electronic 
commerce is essential. However, the lack of suitable dispute resolution 
mechanisms in cyberspace will constitute a serious obstacle to the further 
development of electronic commerce. Bearing this in mind, this paper argues 
that when Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) moves to cyberspace, 
particularly arbitration and mediation as the main types of ADR, the form of 
online alternative dispute resolution (OADR) can maximise the growth of e-
commerce. 
  
 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the internet are two very 
topical issues. Online alternative dispute resolution (OADR), or ADR online, 
refers to the use of internet technology, wholly or partially, as a medium by 
which to conduct the proceedings of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), in 
order to resolve commercial disputes which arise from the use of the internet. 
Those proceedings are operated by neutral private bodies under published 
rules of procedure. 
  
Having said that, it is important to address mandatory OADR.  
This means that the parties are bound to adhere to the OADR process. Indeed, 
it is imperative to display what risks internet users should be willing to take 
with mandatory OADR schemes. This paper concludes that the issue of 
consent should be at the forefront of any contemplated OADR solutions. 
Clearly, it is unacceptable to impose mandatory OADR on internet users 
without their knowledge and consent Instead, a complainant who wishes to 
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avoid the mandatory nature of OADR proceeding must be able to bring the 
action in any court that has a jurisdiction over the dispute. Bearing this in 
mind, there is a strong reason to believe that mandatory OADR schemes 
would not be enforceable in courts, and that the entire scheme of mandatory 




Electronic commerce is important, and perhaps, inevitable. Thus to 
consider the legal implications of the growth and development of electronic 
commerce is essential. However, the lack of suitable dispute resolution 
mechanisms in cyberspace will constitute a serious obstacle to the further 
development of electronic commerce. Bearing this in mind, this paper argues 
that when Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) moves to cyberspace, 
particularly arbitration and mediation as the main types of ADR, the form of 
online alternative dispute resolution (OADR) can maximise the growth of e-
commerce. 
  
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the internet are two very 
topical issues. Online alternative dispute resolution (OADR), or ADR online, 
refers to the use of internet technology, wholly or partially, as a medium by 
which to conduct the proceedings of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 
in order to resolve commercial disputes which arise from the use of the 
internet. Those proceedings are operated by neutral private bodies under 
published rules of procedure. 
  
In the online world, OADR should not be presented as the superior 
alternative to the court system, making the old court system obsolete. OADR 
must not be conceived also as the main force driving changes in dispute 
settlement in cyberspace. Instead, OADR must be conceived as merely a 
stream contributing to the broad river of change in how dispute resolution 
could be managed in cyberspace. OADR is not a substitute for other methods 
of dispute resolution; it is one option available to the internet users. Indeed, 
the idea of OADR is not simply about the use of technology to resolve 
disputes in cyberspace, it is rather about improving choice among other 
alternatives. 
  
In advancing this issue, this paper will analyse the liberty of 
participation in ADR. Then this paper will proceed to address the liberty of 
participation in OADR schemes. After that, this paper will address the 
ICANN policy in using mandatory OADR procedures to resolve disputes 
concerning General Top Level Domain Names. Then this paper will analyse 
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the disparity of bargaining power between consumers and merchants with its 
implications on consumers’ consent to mandatory schemes in OADR. Finally, 
this paper summarises and relates the findings of the paper to each other in a 
coherent way which might help in the future development of OADR. 
  
It must be noted that there will be special references to the 
implications of OADR upon English litigation. Such implications have to be 
analysed because they constitute a reference point for the assessment of the 
quality of justice of a given OADR provider and they provide a framework for 
reflecting upon the general requirements of fair process in OADR. As a result, 
the priority in this research is towards the implications of OADR on the 
United Kingdom and English litigation. The default is the English law where 
it is well developed, appropriate, and constructive. The United Kingdom 
government is enthusiastic about developing the potential for electronic 
transactions, partly as a method of delivering government services, and partly 
as the basis for promoting competition and economic growth. It appears that 
there is now a strong political imperative in the UK to prompt various actions 
that will create trust, reliance, and confidence in doing business over the 
internet. The strategy of the UK government is to make the country the best 
place in the world for e-commerce.1  
  
For the purpose of this paper, business to consumer (B-to-C) internet 
transaction disputes and internet trademark infringement disputes in the form 
of domain name disputes will be deployed as two case studies. Businesses to 
consumer and domain name dispute resolution have been a major area of 
activity for online ADR because of the need to build electronic commerce 
through increasing internet users’ confidence. On the one hand, the domain 
name system is generated and becomes an indispensable element for 
electronic commerce to work properly. Electronic commerce is a source of 
growing demand on domain names because currently there is no effective 
alternative method of finding a company’s internet location. Accordingly, the 
utility of Domain Name System (DNS) should be understood primarily within 
the broader context of electronic commerce and doing business on the 
internet. Due to the nature of the internet, the domain name is as important as 
the business itself, or more precisely, the domain name is the company’s 
primary asset. For the consumer, a domain name allows an access to the 
internet, provides a direct link to the online business, and provides a mode of 
                                                 
1 For a full account on UK government’s strategy in relation to the 
encouragement of e-commerce, see the office of the e-Envoy, available online at 
http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/e-envoy/index-content.htm, last visited on the 1st 
of October 2007. 
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initiating transactions online. Equally, a domain name owner’s interest in a 
domain name is that acquisition of a domain name is considered as a 
prerequisite step to conducting business online. As a result, firms and others, 
increasingly seek to have an internet presence because without a domain 
name, a company would be practically invisible on the internet. Customers 
would not know were to find the company.2 On the other hand, given that a 
business to consumer internet transaction means in a broad sense the sale of 
goods and services over the internet from business entities to individuals 
acting in their personal capacity, uncertainty over the legal framework of B-
to-C internet transaction disputes may inhibit both consumers from 
purchasing products or services over the internet, and companies from 
entering into the electronic marketplace.3  
  
1.2. The Liberty of Participation in ADR 
 
It is important to draw the line between the concepts of binding 
OADR (that the parties should be bound by the outcome of the OADR 
procedures) and mandatory OADR (that the parties are bound to adhere to the 
OADR process). The former concept is beyond the limits of this paper. This 
paper will address the latter concept as it is imperative to display what risks 
internet users should be willing to take with mandatory OADR schemes. 
  
Traditionally, the question of the relationship between ADR and the 
judicial system is very important because ADR schemes should not prejudice 
or undermine any other means of judicial redress.4 Moreover, although ADR 
can provide appropriate solutions for many disputes, it must be recognised 
that even in the most ideal of worlds a certain number of disputes will still end 
up in courts. There are cases which are not appropriate to be adjudicated by 
ADR, and it may not always be in the best interest of everyone to choose to 
participate in ADR. For example, there may be a class action lawsuit which is 
liable to be more effective form of relief than the individual arbitral system. 
Certain harms inflicted on internet users may be small yet widespread, so that 
they would be impractical to pursue certain claims unless brought as a class 
action. Furthermore, competition between court and out-of-court dispute 
settlement should not be exaggerated. One of the facets of this exaggeration is 
                                                 
2 Burk, D., “Trademarks along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law 
of Cyber-Marks”, (1995) 1 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology 9. 
3 Ghemawat, P., “Distance Still Matters”, (2001) 79 Harvard Business Review 
137. 
4 For an intensive discussion on this issue see Lord Woolf Report, “Access to 
Justice: Final Report”, (London, 1996), available online at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm, last visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
106 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 36.1 
 
 
the suggestion that the rule of law is at stake when parties resolve their 
dispute outside of the court.5 In this regard, Harry Edward, a leading author 
on ADR has said that: 
  
We must determine whether ADR will result in an abandonment of 
our constitutional system in which the rule of law is created and principally 
enforced by legitimate branches of government.6  
  
It must be pointed out that Edward’s opinion is unwise, to say the 
least, because it is based on a sharp division between the court system and 
ADR. Such division is unwarranted because ADR is a set of methods that are 
considered alternatives to legalistic methods of dispute resolution. These 
alternative mechanisms are not intended to supplant court adjudication, but 
rather to supplement it. They can operate quite effectively in conjunction 
with, or in the shadow of the court system, since ADR cannot bring together 
unwilling parties to settle their differences, nor does it have the power to 
enforce the outcome of ADR proceeding, as the court do. 
  
Accordingly, it must be clear that participation in ADR does not mean 
waiving the rights to recourse to the ordinary law; rather it means a general 
renunciation of the remedies available in law. In this regard, Professor Roy 
Goode argues that it is difficult to evaluate the advantages of alternative 
dispute resolution over other dispute resolution mechanisms, including courts, 
because various legal options compete with each other in a way which is 
rather unclear. Professor Goode concludes that no system has any innate 
superiority over the other.7  
  
Nowadays, courts are increasingly using ADR mechanisms to settle 
disputes. The fact that courts provide the formal dispute resolution mechanism 
has not ruled out the development of links between them and the techniques 
of ADR. This suggests that an extra-judicial component could be grafted on to 
civil proceedings because ADR is viewed by many as an innovative way to 
                                                 
5 WIPO, “The Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses: 
Intellectual Property issues, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name 
Process”, 30th of April 1999, available online at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf, last visited on 
the 1st of October 2007. 
6 Edwards, H., “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema”, (1986) 
99 Harvard Law Review 668 at 672. 
7 Goode, R., Commercial Law, (2nd edition, Penguin Books Limited, London, 
1995) 1177. 
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improve adjudication procedures by being an alternative avenue of justice for 
both the defendant and the plaintiff. 
  
It must be clear that one of the main incentives to participate in ADR 
schemes is that, while any change to the court system would require an 
adaptation of the legal procedure, alternative forms of dispute settlement 
emphasise the advantages of the flexible and speedy nature of their procedure. 
In actual fact, various countries have introduced pilot schemes whereby courts 
refer the parties in a dispute to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The 
growing use of alternative dispute resolution often is associated with explicit 
annexation of ADR procedures to well known court systems as in the case of 
court annexed arbitration.8  
  
In Aktien Gesellschaft v. Fortuna Co. Inc.,9 it has been stated that 
arbitration and court system ought to be regarded as co-ordinate rather than 
rival. This position was strengthened in England by the introduction of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 which implies that commercial arbitration 
should be complementary to, and not in competition with, court system. 
  
1.3. The Liberty of Participation in OADR Schemes 
 
In the online world, OADR should not be presented as the superior 
alternative to the court system, making the old court system obsolete. OADR 
must not be conceived also as the main force driving changes in dispute 
settlement in cyberspace. Instead, OADR must be conceived as merely a 
stream contributing to the broad river of change in how dispute resolution 
could be managed in cyberspace. OADR is not a substitute for other methods 
of dispute resolution; it is one option available to the internet users. Indeed, 
the idea of OADR is not simply about the use of technology to resolve 
disputes in cyberspace, it is rather about improving choice among other 
alternatives.10  
                                                 
8 Bernstein, L., “Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique 
of Federal Court-Annexed Court Programs”, (1993) 141 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 2169. 
9 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 503. 
10 Tyler, M., and Bretherton, D., “Research into Online Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, an Exploration Report Prepared for the Department of Justice in 
Australia”, 21st of March 2003, available online at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341D
BE097801FF)~0ch+6+amended+Maximising+performance+of+system.pdf/$file/0ch
+6+amended+Maximising+performance+of+system.pdf, last visited on the 1st of 
October 2007. 




It must be noted that OADR and legal redress are two separate issues. 
Access to the latter should not be made conditional on the use or even 
exhaustion of the possibilities offered by the former. This would seriously 
undermine internet users’ confidence in OADR solutions because an effective 
OADR scheme will be used without compulsion. 
  
In actual fact, any comprehensive alternative to the courts should not 
exist in any contemplated OADR scheme. Instead, the notion of OADR 
should be that internet users have certain courthouse rights, but those 
courthouse rights may not be meaningful in small monetary amounts and/or 
on a cross-border level. Indeed, although courthouse rights might not be 
invoked, the fact that it could be invoked is important. In practical terms, 
internet disputes will not probably reach courts, but this theoretical assurance 
of the existence of the court is important. 
  
The letter “A” in OADR, normally stands for alternative. It may be 
useful to replace “alternative”, with, say, “appropriate”. OADR being an 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism in cyberspace does not mean that 
the use of OADR for immediate resolution in cyberspace should preclude 
other forms of dispute resolution. Subsequently, internet users who submit 
disputes to OADR system should not be asked to waive their legal rights, nor 
should they be restricted or blocked from resorting to other avenues of 
recourse. Thus, the basic role of the judicial process as a method of settling 
disputes must be reaffirmed.11  
  
It must be borne in mind that the goal of OADR process is not to 
create new rights, nor to accord greater protection to parties’ rights in 
cyberspace than that which exists elsewhere. Rather, the goal is to give proper 
and adequate expression of parties’ existing rights in the context of the 
medium of the internet. Indeed, OADR should not be viewed as a way to 
create a parallel universe for online disputes in which internet users no longer 
have the rights and protection afforded to them by the legal framework in 
their home countries. 
  
                                                 
11 WIPO, “The Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses: 
Intellectual Property issues, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name 
Process”, 30th of April 1999, available online at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf , last visited on 
the 1st of October 2007. 
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The right of access to courts to settle any type of dispute is a basic 
right. Therefore, one must be compelled to oppose the idea of mandatory 
OADR schemes. Arguably, if mandatory OADR becomes the norm for 
internet disputes, internet users will arguably be less willing to foray into e-
commerce venue for their purchasing, knowing that their remedies are 
limited. Indeed the representation of OADR as the superior alternative to the 
court system is dangerous. It appears safe to assume that OADR should 
remain as an alternative, rather than a mandatory, dispute resolution 
mechanism in cyberspace. 
  
The principle of legality in the EU recommendations on the principles 
applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer 
disputes dictates that ADR bodies, while retaining the flexibility of their 
procedures, should comply with the mandatory law that courts would have to 
apply. This rule can be expressed even more simply: it is inadmissible for an 
ADR body to resolve a dispute in a manner diametrically opposed to the 
decision that a court would have made in the same case. Clearly, the principle 
of legality in the EU recommendations could be seriously endangered in 
mandatory OADR schemes. The principle of legality is attempting to ensure 
that the disputant has knowingly and freely chosen to elect to bind him/her to 
the mechanism’s outcome(s). The principle of legality in the 
recommendations has been expressed as follows: 
  
The decision taken by the body may not result in the consumer being 
deprived of the protection afforded by the mandatory provisions of the law of 
the state in whose territory the body is established. In the case of cross-border 
disputes, the decision taken by the body may not result in the consumer being 
deprived of the protection afforded by the mandatory provisions applying 
under the law of the member state in which he is normally resident in the 
instances provided for under Article 5 of the Rome Convention of 19 June 
1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.12  
  
In this regard, it seems appropriate to recall the opinion of Ian McNeil 
who is one of the leading authors on arbitration law. He argues that it must be 
borne in mind that only court litigation can be commenced without any 
agreement of the other party. Arbitration, and of course other forms of 
                                                 
12 EU Commission, “Recommendations on the Principles Applicable to the 
Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes”, (98/257/EC) 
O.J.L. 115, available online at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1179/01/consumer_justice_gp_follow_COM_1998_198.pdf , last 
visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
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alternative dispute resolution, are available only if the parties at some stage 
agree that the dispute will be resolved by a third party neutral. Unarguably, 
without a fully informed voluntary consent, arbitration and other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution lose all credibility as a just alternative to 
litigation. He said in particular that: 
  
Using terms such as compulsory or mandatory in such circumstances 
is, at best, highly confusing. At worst, it constitutes question begging; the 
very question at stake where such questions arise is whether whatever consent 
to arbitrate as has been manifested should or should not be given full 
contractual effect. To call arbitration compulsory or mandatory is to answer 
by label, not by attention to the facts and by analysis.13  
  
Given that recourse to ADR is generally characterised by the 
predominance of a consensual approach and freedom of contract, OADR 
should be based on voluntary participation, and therefore not deprive the 
parties of their right of access to the courts. From this perspective, restricting 
the options of disputants to OADR only and denying access to the courts 
should not be permissible. As a result, an important task would be to design 
an OADR system in a way that has the potentiality to establish an appropriate 
linkage to court system, but without harming the flexibility of the process. 
From this perspective, it becomes clear that there should be a balance in 
cyberspace between the preservation of the long-tried right to seek redress 
through courts, and processes of alternative dispute resolution, such as 
arbitration, which is rooted in well-established procedures.14  
  
1.3.1. The ICANN Policy in Using Mandatory OADR Procedures to Resolve 
Disputes Concerning General Top Level Domain Names 
 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), which is a non-profit corporation formed to assume responsibility 
for Internet Protocol Address (IP) space allocation, originally obtains its 
authority over domain names from a U.S. Department of Commerce contract 
to administer the root of the system (the ultimate database in which all Top 
Level Domains (TLDs) are registered). The ICANN Uniform Domain Name 
                                                 
13 McNeil, I., Federal Arbitration Law: Agreements, Awards, and Remedies 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, (Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1999) 17-8. 
14 WIPO, “The Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses: 
Intellectual Property issues, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name 
Process”, 30th of April 1999, available online at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf , last visited on 
the 1st of October 2007. 
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Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) is incorporated as a part of the Generic 
Top Level Domain Names (gTLDs) registration agreement which includes 
(.com), (.org) and (.net). The UDRP is imposed by contract upon all of the 
accredited gTLDs registrars and, in turn, imposed by them upon domain name 
holders as a condition of the registration agreement.15  
  
At present, the ICANN policy uses mandatory OADR procedures to 
resolve disputes concerning General Top Level Domain Names (gTLDs) such 
as com, net, and org. In order to register a domain name in any of the 
(gTLDs), an applicant must agree to be bound by UDRP, which utilises 
OADR mechanisms. Consequently, every registrant has agreed to be subject 
to mandatory arbitration when someone else alleges that the domain name is 
identical or confusingly similar to a registered trademark, the registrant has no 
legitimate interest in the domain name, or when it is alleged that the domain 
name has been registered and used in bad faith. In this regard, Article 4 (a) 
reads as follows: 
  
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative 
proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the 
applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that (i) 
your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or 
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no 
rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) 
your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In 
the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of 
these three elements is present.16  
  
It was argued by ICANN that those persons, who register domain 
names in bad faith in abuse of intellectual property of others, would be 
                                                 
15 ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), as 
approved by ICANN on the 24th of October 1999, available online at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm, last visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
Before ICANN, in 1993, after a gradual increase in commercial internet activity, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) subcontracted the job of registering domain 
names to a small company named “Network Solutions”. Network Solutions registered 
domain names on a first-come first-served basis, just as all the internet domain names 
had always been allocated. For an intensive discussion on this issue see Howitt, D., 
“War.com: Why the Battle Over Domain Names Will Never Cease”, (1997) 19 
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 719. 
16 Article 4 (a) of ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDRP), as approved by ICANN on the 24th of October 1999, available online at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm, last visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
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unlikely to choose to submit to a procedure that is cheaper and faster than 
litigation like UDRP.17  
  
The argument that was put forward in order to defend the mandatory 
nature of the UDRP is flawed, to say the least. This is due to the following 
three reasons. First, by confining the scope of the procedures of UDRP to 
abusive registrations, the danger of innocent domain name holders acting in 
good faith being required to participate in the procedure is not eliminated. 
There are non-trademarked, yet legitimate uses of words, names and symbols. 
And, therefore, one must not lose sight of traditional non-commercial internet 
uses.18  
  
Second, there is a perceived unfairness in the application of UDRP 
which favours trademark owners. As a result, there has been considerable 
criticism of the UDRP and calls to revise it on the basis that it reinforces a 
bias towards large commercial interests, namely those who already have 
trademarks registered.19  
  
And third, the UDRP did not address properly the selection 
mechanism of the dispute resolution service provider. By all means, one party 
should not be allowed to choose the third party neutral. Article 6(b) reads as 
follows: 
  
If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-
member Panel (Paragraph 3 (b)(iv) and 5(b)(iv), the Provider shall appoint, 
within five calendar days following receipt of the response by the Provider, or 
the lapse of the time period for the submission thereof, a single Panelist from 
its list of panelists.20  
                                                 
17 WIPO, “The Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses: 
Intellectual Property issues, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name 
Process”, 30th of April 1999, available online at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf , last visited on 
the 1st of October 2007. 
18 Albert, G., “Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between Trademarks and 
Internet Domain Names”, (1997) 15 John Marshall Journal of Computer and 
Information Law 277. 
19 Katsh, E., and Rifkin, J., Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in 
Cyberspace, (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2001) 64. Marcelo, H., and Ajay, N., 
“From International Treaties to Internet Norms: The Evolution of International 
Trademark Disputes in the Internet Age”, (2000) 21 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law 556. 
20 Article 6 (b) of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the 




There is statistical evidence that a vague selection mechanism of the 
third party neutral leads to forum shopping that biases the results. Forum 
shopping is done by rationally selecting an OADR provider who tends to rule 
in the favour of the party who selects the provider or the party with the 
highest bargaining power. Statistics show that the two OADR providers, who 
obtain most cases, WIPO Online Dispute Resolution Centre, and the National 
Arbitration Forum, are more likely to decide in favour of the claimant. The 
claimants win 82.2 per cent of the time with WIPO Online Dispute Resolution 
Centre and 82.9 per cent of the time with National Arbitration Forum.21  
  
Thus, the argument against mandatory OADR schemes must be 
viewed in a wider context than ICANN policy. For instance, there is a 
disparity of bargaining power between consumers and merchants. This would 
have apparent implications on consumers’ consent to mandatory schemes in 
OADR. 
  
1.3.2. The Disparity of Bargaining Power between Consumers and Merchants 
with its Implications on Consumers’ Consent to Mandatory Schemes in 
OADR. 
 
National laws apply in some cases irrespective of any choice made by 
the parties. This is likely to be found in areas such as consumer protection. 
Often, laws relating to consumer protection will strike out choice of law 
clauses, or else restrict the impact of such clauses, including dispute 
settlement clauses, and thus render them ineffective. This is reasonable since 
one distinguishing characteristic of consumer protection issues is the disparity 
of bargaining power between consumers and merchants. In actual fact, the 
disparity of bargaining power between consumers and merchants has lead 
legislators to prescribe special terms for consumer contracts.22 For example, 
Article 5 of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations reads as follows: 
  
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 [providing that a contract 
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties], a choice of law made by 
                                                                                                                    
“Rules”), as approved by ICANN on the 24th of October 1999, available online at 
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, last visited on the 1st of 
October 2007. 
21 Katsh, E., and Rifkin, J., Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in 
Cyberspace, (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2001) 111. 
22 Heiskanen, V., “Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce”, 
(1999) 16 Journal of International Arbitration 31. 
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the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the 
protection afforded him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in 
which he has his habitual residence.23  
  
The disparity of bargaining power between consumers and merchants 
happens particularly when the reference to out-of-court dispute settlement is 
exclusive. That is to say the dispute can no longer be brought before the 
courts. In this regard, the EU Recommendations on principles applicable to 
the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes 
strongly suggests that there are legal limits on the ability of any ADR system 
to foreclose access to the court system by consumers. The Recommendations 
states that: 
  
Use of the out-of-court alternative may not deprive consumers of their 
right to bring the matter before the courts unless they expressly agree to do so, 
in full awareness of the facts and only after the dispute has materialised.24  
  
Similarly, Article 3 of the European Council Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts has expressly forbidden the contractual term 
that excludes or hinders the consumers’ right to take legal action or exercise 
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take 
disputes exclusively to arbitration. Article 3 reads as follows: 
  
Member states may provide that clauses are presumptively unfair 
which excludes or hinder the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise 
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take 
disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly 
restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof 
which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the 
contract.25  
  
In actual fact Article 3 of the Directive relates to terms which are pre-
established by businesses, which includes dispute settlement clauses. In 
                                                 
23 Article 5 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, (80/934/EC) O.J.L. 266. 
24 EU Commission, “Recommendations on the Principles Applicable to the 
Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes”, (98/257/EC) 
O.J.L. 115, available online at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1179/01/consumer_justice_gp_follow_COM_1998_198.pdf , last 
visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
25 Article 3 of the European Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, (93/13/EC) O.J.L. 95. 
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essence, Article 3 of the Directive states that by leaving the choice of dispute 
settlement mechanism with the consumer, businesses will avoid the risk of 
having an unfair contract term in their consumer contracts.26  
  
Arguably, mandatory arbitration clauses are designed to give 
businesses significant advantages in their disputes with consumers. Merchants 
may know the arbitrators, or the angles of arbitration process more than 
average consumers. They may have a record or other source of information on 
arbitrators’ decisions. This superior knowledge about the general attitudes and 
tendencies of the arbitrator gives an advantage to the merchant. But the 
consumer is regarded generally as economically weaker and less experienced 
in legal matters than the merchant. The consumer is unlikely to have any 
information about the prior rulings or background of the suggested 
arbitrators.27  
  
The disparity of bargaining power occurs quite often when sellers 
unilaterally specify the terms of the sale, including dispute settlement clauses, 
and offering them to consumers on a “take it or leave it” basis. In fact, most 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses are in a standard form. When consumers form 
post-dispute arbitration agreements, they are likely to be mentally focused on 
the dispute. In contrast, when they form pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 
they are unlikely to be focused on the possibility of a dispute, and perhaps 
unaware of the existence of the arbitration clause. As a matter of fact, it is 
difficult to perceive pre-imposed arbitration clauses as fair clauses, when the 
parties do not have equal bargaining power, equal experience in arbitration, 
equal ability to understand the consequences of contract language, particularly 
the ramifications of the rights being waived, and an equal ability to insist on 
clauses being included or excluded in the contract.28  
  
In the online world, it is crucial that electronic commerce and OADR 
solutions are not be promoted at the expense of consumer protection standards 
because consumer protection, which generates consumer confidence, is 
critical for the continued growth of electronic commerce and OADR. 
  
Article 1 (Sphere of application) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce provides: 
                                                 
26 De Zylva, M., “Effective Means of Resolving Distance Selling Disputes”, 
(2001) 67 Arbitration 236. 
27 Thornburg, E., “Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute 
Resolution”, (2000) 34 University of California Law Review 210. 
28 Ibid. 




This law does not override any rule of law intended for the protection 
of consumers.29   A similar viewpoint is adopted in the OECD Guidelines for 
consumer protection in the context of electronic commerce: 
  
Consumers who participate in electronic commerce should be 
afforded transparent and effective consumer protection that is not less 
than the level or protection afforded in other forms of commerce.30     
  
Henry Perritt, a leading author on OADR, has argued that online 
consumers, due to the internet, are more powerful than offline consumers. 
This is due to the fact that the internet intensifies competition because it offers 
consumers a wide array of products and services from different sellers than 
they would have in geographically defined markets.31  
  
Robert Bordone, another leading author on OADR, has responded to 
Perritt’s argument by saying that Perritts’s assertion is paradoxical. Electronic 
consumers are not always aware of the law and culture applicable in 
cyberspace, and are often not represented due to the low monetary value of 
electronic disputes in general. By contrast, electronic merchants have the 
greatest experience of the law and culture applicable in cyberspace, and are 
likely to obtain the finest representation.32  
  
Elisabeth Thornburg, another leading author on OADR, agreed with 
Gordone in his argument. She argued also that the disparity of bargaining 
power between consumers and merchants occurs quite often in the online 
environment where the contract is usually “take it or leave it” standardised 
form. According to Thornburg, in order to view the contract, the internet user 
must click on the “terms and conditions” button and only after he or she has 
agreed on such terms and conditions, including dispute resolution terms and 
conditions, the online transaction will continue. This is called click-wrap 
                                                 
29 Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide 
to Enactment (1996), available online at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model.ht
ml, last visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
30 OECD, “Consumer Protection in the Electronic Marketplace”, DSTI/CP (98) 
13/Final, available online at http://venus.icre.go.kr/metadata/12005_12E81082.pdf, 
last visited on the 1st of October 2007. 
31 Perritt, H., “Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of 
ADR”, (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 698. 
32 Bordone, R., “Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: Approach, Potential, 
Problems and a Proposal”, (1998) 3 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 203. 
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agreements. Because of the electronic format, an internet user cannot cross 
out terms and bargain for different terms. In this case, it might be difficult to 
prove the consent of the parties because consent depends on the existence of 
choice, and if the choice is absent, the purported consent cannot be said to be 
voluntary.33  
  
Obviously, contracts which come as part of a standard form that is not 
subject to bargaining are called contracts of adhesion. Evidently, determining 
the voluntary nature of consent is the centrepiece of debates over contracts of 
adhesion. As a result, mandatory OADR clauses could be seen as imposed 




Without doubt, the issue of consent should be at the forefront of any 
contemplated OADR solutions. Clearly, it is unacceptable to impose 
mandatory OADR on internet users without their knowledge and consent 
Instead, a complainant who wishes to avoid the mandatory nature of OADR 
proceeding must be able to bring the action in any court that has a jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Bearing this in mind, there is a strong reason to believe that 
mandatory OADR schemes would not be enforceable in courts, and that the 
entire scheme of mandatory OADR might be unworkable. In the online world, 
OADR should not be presented as the superior alternative to the court system, 
making the old court system obsolete. OADR must not be conceived also as 
the main force driving changes in dispute settlement in cyberspace. Instead, 
OADR must be conceived as merely a stream contributing to the broad river 
of change in how dispute resolution could be managed in cyberspace. OADR 
is not a substitute for other methods of dispute resolution; it is one option 
available to the internet users. Indeed, the idea of OADR is not simply about 
the use of technology to resolve disputes in cyberspace, it is rather about 
improving choice among other alternatives.
                                                 
33 Thornburg, E., “Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute 
Resolution”, (2000) 34 University of California Law Review 1179. 
34 Rakoff, T., “Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction”, (1984) 96 
Harvard Law Review 1172. Griffiths, D, “Contracting on the Internet”, [1997] 
European Intellectual Property Review 4. 
